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Abstract
We analyse the proposed “Stability Pact” for countries joining a European
Monetary Union (EMU). In an EMU shortsighted governments fail to fully
internalise the inflationary consequences of their debt policies. This results
in excessive debt accumulation. Therefore, while in the absence of EMU
governments have no incentive to sign a stability pact, under an EMU they
prefer a stability pact which punishes excessive debt accumulation. With
idiosyncratic shocks to the governments’ budgets, an EMU combined with
an appropriately designed stability pact will be strictly preferred to au-
tonomy. While the stability pact corrects the average debt bias, inflation,
which is attuned to the union-average debt level, is more stable.
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1. Introduction
European monetary unification is inching closer. With it, the dicey issues of the
relationships of the individual countries with a common monetary policy move into
the spotlight of attention. One might take the point of view that there should be
no problems at all: a conservative and independent European Central Bank (ECB)
will simply ensure low and stable inflation, while the individual countries select the
fiscal policies they prefer. But most commentators view these relationships as more
complicated. In particular, there is the fear that a high-deficit member country or
a member country in recession may successfully pressure the ECB into loosening its
monetary policy. This will create additional inflation and, according to many theories,
real effects in the entire union. In other words, there might be a feedback from the
fiscal policy of a member country to economic conditions in all other countries, which
are now transmitted more tightly via an influencable ECB1
In light of this worry, a “Stability Pact” has been proposed. The essence of the
Stability Pact is to closely watch the fiscal deficit of each member country, and punish
those, whose deficits are deemed excessive. The proposed punishment takes the form
of a payment in the order of some non-negligible fraction of GNP. Given the intensive
discussion about the Pact in the political sphere, it is of great importance to try to
clear up the theoretical issues involved here. The purpose of this paper is to do exactly
that.
Of course, there is a large literature on the strategic issues of monetary policy and
monetary union, see for example the surveys and bookform contributions in CEPR
(1991), Cukierman (1992), de Grauwe (1994), Eijffinger and de Haan (1996), Giavazzi
(1988), Giovannini (1996), Kenen (1995) and Persson and Tabellini (1994). But very
little has so far been contributed to understanding the relationships of countries after
the monetary unification has taken place, and how they can be improved upon with
additional institutional arrangements such as the Stability Pact.
1The issue of fiscal debt versus monetary policy is nicely discussed by Dornbusch (1996). He argues
that the dangers of excessive debts for monetary policy are a thing of the past: “...the Maastricht
criteria were fighting the last war, not a present issue. The debt issues are real, but their impact
on monetary policy is not.” This paper is written just in case the “last war” isn’t quite over yet.
Furthermore, in the context of multiple countries, additional strategic feedback issues arise, which
are at the heart of this paper.
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The role of the Stability Pact can be examined from a number of different angles,
and we cannot possibly discuss all of these in this paper. Here, we just take one
particular point of view: while it is unlikely to be the entire story, we believe it to be
an important part of it. Our point of view is the following. Given their terminable
stay in office, policymakers are often compelled into taking a rather short-term point
of view. In particular, it often looks attractive to raise additional debt to pay for
expenditures, which benefit in particular the constituency of the party in power, and
then leave it to the successor to worry about repaying that debt. The successor will
have to rely on a mix of inflation as well as taxes to deal with this problem.
In such a situation, a Stability Pact comes in handy. With such a Pact, a number of
countries agree beforehand to punish each other if somebody raises too much debt. The
idea is to use the enforcement by others to commit to a low-debt policy beforehand, a
policy, which is beneficial from an ex-ante point of view. The problem will be that the
other countries have no particular reasons to actually proceed with the punishment
in case of a recalcitrant country: there is nothing at stake for the potential enforcers.
As a result, signing a Stability Pact does not make sense for a group of independent
countries.
Having a common central bank changes all that. While the successor to a high-
debt policymaker will try to solve part of the debt problem by boosting inflation,
this inflation channel will now operate through the ECB, imposing an inflationary
burden on all other countries as well. Suddenly, there is something at stake for the
other countries, and they are willing to be serious about enforcing fiscal responsibility.
Signing a Stability Pact now makes sense and improves welfare for all participating
countries. We therefore explain why we see countries entering a Stability Pact only
after they have already agreed to join a monetary union, i.e. why we do not see a
group of arbitrary countries elsewhere entertaining such a possibility.
While this reasoning may sound appealing, a more formal analysis is called for to
clearly understand the mechanism and to iron out potential fallacies in the heuristic
description above. We do this in the remainder of the paper. Based on the work by
Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Tabellini and Alesina (1990) and Cukierman, Edwards
and Tabellini (1992), in Section 2 we construct a model of centralised monetary pol-
icymaking and decentralised fiscal policymaking by governments which are myopic
because they can be voted out of office. Section 3 explores debt policy in the absence
of a Stability Pact. We study the effects of commitment, union size and central bank
independence on equilibrium debt accumulation. Section 4 introduces the Stability
2
Pact and shows how governments that would otherwise not sign such a Pact, would
want to do so if monetary unification goes ahead. Section 5 considers a variation,
in which the first-period budget constraint is stochastic. It is shown that a Stability
Pact widens the debt distribution, but that an optimal Stability Pact can be found
for which countries would rather join the EMU than stay autonomous. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2. The Model
What we want to capture in our model is some interaction between several governments
and a common central bank, in which the governments have the possibility to raise
debt and in which the common central bank sets monetary policy. We want this model
to have the property that governments would choose excessive amounts of debt in the
absence of regulating constraints other than the need to repay the debt eventually:
curbing these excesses will be the role of the Stability Pact. Such a feature captures
the short-sightedness of governments in power alluded to in the Introduction: raising
debt is attractive if some other future government has to worry about repaying it.
There are two periods (t = 1, 2). A European Monetary Union (EMU) is formed by
n countries. Therefore, monetary policy is centralised, while fiscal policy is conducted
at the national level. The situation of national monetary policymaking corresponds
to the special case of n = 1.
Countries are assumed to be identical both in their economic and political structure
and in their preferences. Consider some participating country i (i = 1, .., n). Society
i’s expected utility is given by
US,i(f1i, g1i, f2i, g2i) = u(f1i + g1i) + E[f2i + g2i − π
2/(2φ)], (2.1)
where fti ≥ 0 and gti ≥ 0 are public goods in period t and π is the common, union-wide
inflation rate, which is determined in the second period. Parameter φ is the inverse of
the degree of inflation aversion. E[.] denotes the expectations operator. This utility
function can be thought of as a social welfare function which aggregates the preferences
of all agents in society. The function u(.) is twice continuously differentiable with
u′(.) > 0 and u′′(.) < 0. For convenience, we assume that u(0) = 0 and that u′(1) = 1.
Furthermore, we assume that u′(2) < p, where p is introduced below. We abstract
from discounting.
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There are two political parties, F and G, which are selected to run the government
by an election with random outcome. Party F cares only about public good fti, while
party G only cares about public good gti. Hence, the utilities of parties F and G are
given by, respectively:
UFi(f1i, g1i, f2i, g2i) = u(f1i) + E[f2i − π
2/(2φ)],
UGi(f1i, g1i, f2i, g2i) = u(g1i) + E[g2i − π
2/(2φ)].
Without loss of generality we assume that in each country party F is in office in period
1. It will be re-elected at the end of the first period with an exogenous probability of
p, where 0 < p < 1. The assumption that each of the parties only cares about one
public good is not uncommon in this literature. Economically, each party just caters
to its own constituency. In particular, if some party looses power, but leaves a lot
of debt to its successor, that successor can only afford rather meager expenses in the
other public good while repaying the debt under the budget constraint to be stated
below: this meagerness, however, does not affect the constituency of the party that
has just lost power. Thus, these assumptions capture the short-sightedness aluded to
above.
There is unrestricted borrowing and lending on the world capital market. All debt
is non-indexed. This reflects the usual practice in European countries. Ideally, the
model should determine the optimal degree of debt indexation. However, to keep the
analysis tractable, we do not explicitly model the factors that would make non-indexed
debt optimal. One reason for having nominal debt would be the presence of shocks
to the budget. In that case, nominal debt can be used as a way to hedge the real
revenues required by the government [see Bohn (1988), Calvo and Guidotti (1993)].2
Before stating the budget constraints, it is important to introduce the impact of
a Stability Pact on these constraints. We want a Stability Pact to result in a penalty
for countries that raise too much debt: for our purposes, we will model this penalty as
a linear function of excessive debt. We allow for penalties both in the period in which
the debt is issued as well as in the period that the debt is repaid. A country running
a surplus instead should not be similarly subsidized, however: penalties should not
be allowed to be negative. Unfortunately, such a kink in the penalty function makes
the analysis of the model hard. We therefore assume that the penalty function is
2An unfavourable shock to the budget would require an inflation surprise which reduces real debt
servicing costs, while a favourable shock requires unexpectedly low inflation.
4
linear over the entire range of debt choices. One should thus keep in mind, that the
model only delivers meaningful predictions, as long as countries do not run deficits
below or, at least, not much below the penalty threshold in equilibrium. However, the
equilibria which we are going to study all turn out to involve debt levels above the
socially optimal level. For deviations from the socially optimal level in that direction,
our linearity assumption should be fine. Regarding the penalties paid, we also need to
make an assumption as to their usage. We assume, that the penalty payments will be
distributed to the other countries, which benefits in particular countries with a small
or no deficit.
We are now ready to state the government budget constraints. Assuming that all
debt is paid off in the second period and that aggregate resources in each period are
equal to one, the budget constraints of the governments (or resource constraints for
the economy) in the first and second period are given by, respectively,






ψ1(bj − b̄), (2.2)
f2i + g2i = 1− bi[1 + π






ψ2(bj − b̄), (2.3)
where bi is the amount of debt issued by the first-period government and traded on the
world market. For convenience, we have assumed that the real world market interest
rate is zero. In order for risk-neutral agents to be willing to hold government bonds,
the nominal interest rate, 1 + πe, includes a mark-up equal to the expected inflation
rate. The ex-post real interest rate is given by 1 + πe − π.
We assume that ψ1 < 1 and ψ2 > −1: that way, increases in bi will always result
in an increase in the first-period budget and (for πe = π) in a decrease in the second-
period budget, if all other countries leave their debt level unchanged. However, we
do not rule out at this point the possibility of a subsidy rather than a penalty to the
incurrence of debt. Absence of a Stability Pact corresponds to ψ1 = ψ2 = 0. If a
Stability Pact has been signed and country i accumulates debt in excess of b̄ it pays a
fine of ψ1(bi−b̄) in period 1 and a fine of ψ2(bi−b̄) in period 2.3 Here b̄ is some reference
debt level (for example, 60% of GDP in the case of the Maastricht Treaty). The final
term on the right hand sides of the budget constraints is the rebatement of the fines
3It may seem to be a bit peculiar to include a first-period punishment ψ1(bi − b̄). However, this
can be thought of as a punishment taking place almost immediately after the debt has been issued.
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paid by the other members of the union. This rebatement ensures that countries have
an interest in the ex-post enforcement of the punishment of other countries. The sum
of the fines and the rebatements is zero in each period, hence the federal budget is
balanced on a period by period basis.
Monetary policy is conducted at a supranational level by the European Central
Bank (ECB). We assume that the common, union-wide inflation rate (which is selected
in the second period) is under direct control of the ECB. In the absence of political
pressure (that is, under complete independence), its objective would be to maximise
−π2/(2φ), where φ reflects how severely the central banker is punished for deviations
from price stability. Such an objective function would reflect the spirit of the Maas-
tricht Treaty, which gives the ECB a mandate for price stability. We allow, however,
for the possibility that the ECB is not completely independent. In particular, the ECB
attaches a relative weight λ (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) to its objective under complete independence
and a relative weight 1 − λ to an equally-weighted average of the objectives of the
second-period governments in each of the individual countries. Ignoring an irrelevant























bi, where α ≡ φ(1− λ). (2.4)
Therefore, λ = 1 or, equivalently, α = 0 corresponds to an extremely independent
ECB, while λ = 0 or α = φ corresponds to an extremely dependent ECB. If 0 < λ < 1
or 0 < α < φ, the ECB is partially independent and, therefore, more “conservative”
than the representative agent in the union (that is, the ECB attaches a larger relative
weight to price stability — see Rogoff, 1985).
Although the Maastricht Treaty requires the ECB to be completely independent,
in reality one could well imagine countries trying to influence its policies through the
appointment of Board Members or simply by putting sheer political pressure on the
ECB.4 Therefore we allow for the possibility that the ECB is partially independent.
Moreover, it is interesting to explore how debt accumulation and the Stability Pact
are affected by the degree of independence of the ECB.
4In this respect it is interesting to observe the “overt French efforts to set up a political council
to track, or guide, the supposedly independent European (Central) bank” (The Economist, January
25, 1997, page 25).
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3. No Stability Pact
In this section we study policies and welfare in the absence of a Stability Pact (i.e.,
ψ1 = ψ2 = 0). We do so in order to illustrate more clearly the effects of introducing
such a Pact.
3.1. Benchmark: the Social Planner
Societies’ welfare is highest if all policy instruments (both in the first and in the
second period) are selected by a Social Planner (SP). Moreover, the SP is able to
commit to an inflation rate announced before debt contracts are signed.5 It is easy
to see that the SP sets π = 0, bi ≡ bSPi = 0, f1i + g1i = 1 and f2i + g2i = 1, for
all i = 1, .., n. The intratemporal allocation of resources over the two types of public
goods is indeterminate because of their perfect substitutability in societies’ welfare
functions.
3.2. The ECB is able to commit
From now on, we assume that fiscal policies are decided at the decentralised level by
the government which is in power.
Suppose that the ECB is able to commit to an inflation rate it announces before
debt contracts are signed in period 1. Expected inflation equals the announced infla-
tion rate and the term πe − π drops out of (2.4). Hence, the ECB finds it optimal to
commit to a zero inflation rate.
Again, consider some EMU participant i (i = 1, .., n). In period 2, the amount of
debt carried over from the first period is given. Hence, if party F is in power, it sets
f2i = 1 − bi and g2i = 0. If party G is in power, it sets f2i = 0 and g2i = 1 − bi.
In period 1, party F chooses f1i = 1 + bi and g1i = 0, where bi maximises party F’s
expected utility, which is given by u(1 + bi) + p(1 − bi). Hence, the amount of debt
chosen under commitment, bCi , is implicitly given by
u′(1 + bCi ) = p. (3.1)
Because p < 1, bCi > 0. Since u
′(2) < p by assumption, we have bCi < 1 and hence,
debt repayments do not exceed second-period resources. Comparing bCi with b
SP
i , we
5The assumption of commitment is not strictly necessary with the normalisations we have imposed
on u(.). Even in the absence of commitment would the SP choose bi = 0 (i = 1, .., n), and, hence,
π = 0 (see the derivation of the solution of the model below).
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see that the amount of debt will be suboptimally high from society’s viewpoint if
it is selected by the government in period 1. The reason is that the latter does not
completely internalise the future benefits of lower debt. That is, it does not internalise
society’s benefit from the provision of good g2i in the case that party G takes office
the period 2. Equation (3.1) shows that a lower p implies a higher bCi . The lower the
probability of a re-election, the more the incumbent discounts the future, and, hence,
the more debt it issues.
3.3. Discretion
From now on we assume that the ECB is not able to commit. In period 2, therefore,
the ECB chooses π so as to maximise (2.4), taking as given πe. This yields:






Hence, the inflation rate is determined by the average stock of outstanding debt, b̃.
An individual country’s increase in public debt thus raises the common inflation rate,
but only by “1 over n”.
In period 1 the government of country i maximises over bi:
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which yields the following first-order condition for bi (where we remember to take into
account the dependence of b̃ on bi):




In equilibrium, the selected amount of debt will be the same for each country. This
is easy to see because the right hand side of (3.4) is the same for all i. The strict
concavity of u(.) thus guarantees that, in equilibrium, for all countries i (i = 1, .., n),
bi = bD,n, where the superscript n indicates the size of the monetary union. Hence,
the equilibrium debt level and the equilibrium inflation rate are determined by:
6Note that from the perspective of the governments, when they select their debt levels, inflation
expectations still need to be determined. Inflation expectations will adjust one-for-one with any effects
of debt policy on future realised inflation. Hence, πe = π from the viewpoint of the governments
when they choose their debt levels.
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πD,n = αbD,n. (3.6)
3.3.1. National monetary policymaking (n = 1)
We have the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1. Denote by V rS the equilibrium social welfare level under regime r,
where r = SP (=Social Planner), C (=Commitment) or D (=Discretion). One has:
1. 0 = bSP < bD,1 < bC.










2. Define society’s expected indirect utility function for given b, under the assump-
tion that inflation is fixed at zero, by VS(b) ≡ u(1 + b) + (1 − b). It is easy to
see that V ′S(b) > 0, for b < 0, and V
′
S(b) < 0, for b > 0.
3. We show this by means of an example. Assume that u(x) = −(ξ− 1)x2/2 + ξx,
where ξ > 2− p. Clearly, on the interval [0, ξ/(ξ − 1)] this function satisfies all
our assumptions. Hence, from (3.5) we have that bD,1 = (1−p)/((α2/φ)+ξ−1).
Note that 1 + bD,1 < ξ/(ξ − 1), as required by our assumptions. Using the
expression for bD,1, we find (after some manipulation) that:









Hence, for α ≥ 0, ∂V DS /∂α > 0. Use (3.5) and (3.6) to note that, if α →
0, bD,1 → bC and πD,1 → πC and, hence, V DS → V
C
S . Hence, for the above





Proposition 3.1 thus shows that discretion may yield higher social welfare than
commitment. The reason for this rather counter-intuitive result is that the model fea-
tures two distortions: a political distortion, leading to excessive debt, and the absence
of commitment, leading to excessive inflation. Removing one distortion (the failure to
commit) may worsen the other distortion (excessive debt). In particular, the incentive
to issue too much debt is kept in check by the prospects of higher future inflation
(compare with Obstfeld, 1991, Jensen, 1994, Van der Ploeg, 1995, and Beetsma and
Bovenberg, 1997, where the same result is found in different models). Commitment,
however, guarantees zero inflation on the outset and, thus, takes away the incentive to
restrain debt accumulation. Apparently, for the utility function in Proposition 3.1(3)
the welfare losses arising from excessive debt outweigh those arising from excessive
inflation. However, note that, although commitment may not be optimal from the
viewpoint of society at large, it is optimal for the party in power in period 1.
3.3.2. Supranational monetary policymaking (n > 1)
We have the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2. Consider the discretionary case.
1. The equilibrium debt level is increasing both in the number of EMU participants
and the degree of central bank independence.
2. Suppose that α = φ (a completely dependent ECB). An increase in n reduces
social welfare. In particular, transferring monetary policy from the national level
(i.e., n = 1) to an ECB (i.e., n > 1) reduces social welfare.
Proof:
1. Follows immediately from (3.5).
2. If φ = α, (3.5) reduces to u′(1 + bD,n) = p + φbD,n/n. Hence, one has that
bD,1 < bD,2 < ... Because π′(b) > 0 (where π(b) is inflation as a function of the
equilibrium debt level, conform (3.6)) and u(1 + b) + (1− b) is decreasing in b
for b > 0 (see the proof of Proposition 3.1(2)), u(1 + b) + (1− b)− π2(b)/(2φ) is
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decreasing in b if b > bSP = 0. Moreover, using Proposition 3.1(1) we have that
bSP < bD,1. Hence, societies’ welfare is decreasing in the size of the union, n.
•
The intuition for Proposition 3.2(1) is as follows: we saw earlier that the failure of
the central bank to commit gives the first-period government the incentive to restrain
debt accumulation. In a union this incentive is weakened, because the effect of a
unilateral reduction in debt on the common inflation rate is only “1 over n ” (see also
Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1995). Hence, bD,1 < bD,n < bC (n > 1). Similarly, if the
degree of central bank independence increases (i.e., α decreases; the ECB becomes
more conservative), the incentive to restrain debt accumulation for the purpose of
reducing future inflation also weakens.
4. Introducing a Stability Pact
The Stability Pact is an agreement by which countries will be punished for excessive
deficits (or, equivalently, excessive debts). The implicit argument behind the punish-
ments is that they help to avoid a situation in which the ECB has no other choice
than to monetise the public debt.
We now want to analyse such a Stability Pact more formally. It may be good to
recall the budget constraints (2.2) and (2.3): raising too much debt induces penalty
payments, which are distributed to all the other countries in the Pact.
With perfect capital markets (so that the real interest is unaffected by other coun-
tries’ policies) and in the absence of monetary unification, countries have no interest
in surveying each other’s debt policies, because there are no cross-country spillovers
from individual countries’ debt policies. Countries might want to sign a Stability Pact
only for the purpose of tying the hands of their own governments.
But this all changes with a monetary union. Glimpsing at the results ahead, we
will show that monetary unification strengthens the case for a Stability Pact. What
is at work here is that, in a monetary union, an individual country’s budgetary policy
causes spillovers because it affects the common inflation rate in the union. A Stability
Pact then becomes useful not only as a substitute for binding one’s own government to
a disciplined budgetary policy, but also as an instrument for surveying other countries’
debt policies. Keep in mind, however, what was shown above: monetary unification
first exacerbates the debt problem in the absence of a Stability Pact, because it di-
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minishes the incentives to restrain debt for the purpose of lower future inflation. We
therefore like to think of the monetary union already agreed upon for reasons outside
the model: our focus is simply on the question of whether a Stability Pact can improve
matters (it can) and whether it would do so as well in the absence of a monetary union
(it does not). We therefore explain, why we see countries entering a Stability Pact
only after they have already agreed to join a monetary union.
It is a good idea to first state some properties about the behaviour of the ECB as
well as about the equilibrium utilities of countries and governments. As for the central
bank, note that its behaviour purely depends on the equilibrium level of average debt,
as equation (2.4) shows: the penalty payments all cancel in the aggregate. Thus,
equation (3.2) continues to hold:






As for the equilibrium utilities in a symmetric equilibrium, we get the same cancella-
tions of penalty payments and reimbursements from other countries:
Proposition 4.1. Consider a symmetric equilibrium with debt level b in all countries
and where the inflation rate is set by the central bank at π = αb as a function of the
equilibrium level of debt. Then:
1. The equilibrium utility of the social planner is given by




whereas the equilibrium utility of the government of country i is given by




2. As functions of b, the equilibrium utility levels are strictly concave, achiev-
ing their maximum at b = 0 for the social planner and at bD,1 > 0 for the
government,7 where bD,1 is implicitly defined in equation (3.5) for n = 1.
3. From the point of view of a government, an EMU with or without Stability Pact
cannot be better than no EMU. Equality is achieved if and only if the debt levels
set in an EMU with Stability Pact are equal to bD,1.
7This is not a typo: indeed, the maximum is not achieved at bD,n, but at bD,1.
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Proof: Straightforward. Note in particular that (4.2) coincides with (3.3) for
n = 1. •
4.1. The effects of a Stability Pact on debt accumulation
To obtain the debt level chosen by a government, one needs to consider the original
statement of the problem and not the equilibrium utilities (4.2). Doing this, one sees
that the first-order condition for the amount of debt selected by the government of
country i in period 1 is now given by:




Note that b̄ does not feature in (4.3) because b̄ does not affect the marginal cost of an
additional unit of debt. Again, this is due to the linearity assumption for our penalty
function.
By symmetry, the equilibrium debt levels are equal for all participants. Hence, the
equilibrium debt level is determined by the condition:




The effects of signing a Stability Pact on debt accumulation are illustrated in
Figures 4.1 and 4.2. For convenience, we consider the cases of first-period and second-
period punishments separately. Figure 4.1 assumes that ψ1 = 0. Hence, the equi-
librium debt level is determined by the intersection of the curves y = u′(1 + b) and
y = p(1 +ψ2) +α2b/(φn) in Figure 4.1. A decrease in the degree of central bank inde-
pendence increases the slope of the second curve and thus reduces the equilibrium debt
level. We call this effect the “independence effect”. An increase in ψ2, the marginal
punishment, causes an upward shift of this curve and further reduces the equilibrium
debt level. This effect will be termed the “second-period punishment effect”. In a
sense, the effective real interest rate, 1+ψ2, is increased, which leads to a substitution
away from present government consumption towards future government consumption.
Figure 4.2 assumes that ψ2 = 0. Debt is unambiguously reduced by the “first-
period punishment effect”. The effective real interest rate, 1/(1 − ψ1), rises. Hence,
current government consumption becomes more expensive in terms of future govern-
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2nd per. punishment effect
Figure 4.1: This figure demonstrates the independence effect of increasing the level of
central bank independence as well as the second-period punishment effect of increasing
ψ2.
ment consumption, which leads to a substitution away from present towards future
government consumption.
We summarise these insights and restate them formally:
Proposition 4.2. For ψ1 < 1, the equilibrium debt level b is a differentiable and
strictly decreasing function of ψ1 and ψ2.
Proof: Use implicit differentiation. •
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1st per. punishment effect
Figure 4.2: This figure demonstrates the first-period punishment effect of increasing
ψ1.
4.2. The optimal choice of a Stability Pact
Having established how a Stability Pact affects debt accumulation, we turn now to the
problem of finding the optimal Stability Pact. We assume that it is signed before first-
period policies are selected. As regards to the question who signs the Pact we consider
two possibilities. The first is when a Constrained Social Planner (CSP) signs the Pact.
The CSP maximises social welfare, but is constrained in that monetary policy is set
by a central bank “out of control” of the social planner: this case therefore serves as
a benchmark for the second and more interesting case in which the Pact is signed by
the governments in power. These governments maximise their own utility rather than
social welfare.
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4.2.1. A CSP signs the Stability Pact
The CSP selects the punishment parameters ψ1 and ψ2. Hence, the equilibrium debt
level is implicitly determined by (4.4), which we can rewrite as:











Hence, choosing ψ1 > 0 and ψ2 > 0 such that p(1 + ψ2)/(1 − ψ1) = 1 implies an
equilibrium debt level of b = 0 and an inflation rate of zero. Hence, social welfare is
maximised and is equal to that attained by an unconstrained social planner analysed
previously. This shows that it is possible, in principle, for the countries in a monetary
union to sign a Stability Pact offsetting the distortions caused by the common cen-
tral bank, as long as debt levels are set by a “national referendum” rather than the
particular and short-sighted government in power.
4.2.2. First-period governments sign the Stability Pact
We turn now to the case where the Stability Pact is signed by the governments of the
participating countries at the start of the first period (i.e., before any policy measures
are taken). We first consider the possibility of introducing a Stability Pact in the
absence of a monetary union. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 4.3. Suppose that monetary policy is selected at the national level
(n = 1). Then, individual governments will be strictly worse off if they sign the
Stability Pact.8
Proof: Note that “no Stability Pact” is equivalent to ψ1 = ψ2 = 0. Recall that
the equilibrium debt level b is a strictly decreasing function of ψ1 and ψ2, see Proposi-
tion 4.2. Recall the strict concavity of (4.2) as a function of b, and the fact that (4.2)
is maximised at b = bD,1, the debt level chosen by a government without a Stability
Pact and with its monetary policy set at the national level, see Proposition 4.1. The
proposition above is now an immediate consequence. •
The intuition for Proposition 4.3 is as follows. An individual government would
want to choose an amount of debt equal to bD,1 > 0. From the viewpoint of an
8By signing a stability pact, we mean choosing ψ1 or ψ2 different from zero. The trivial case of
ψ1 = ψ2 = 0 is excluded.
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individual government, however, if ψ1 > 0 and/or ψ2 > 0, the marginal cost of an
additional unit of debt increases, hence the chosen debt level is lower than bD,1. The
point is that an individual government fails to internalise that the other governments
would also want to issue more debt and that no country would have to pay a fine if
they all choose bD,1.
Now, suppose instead, that a monetary union has been formed. We have the
following proposition:
Proposition 4.4. Suppose a monetary union is formed (n > 1). Then, for some
ψ̄1 > 0 and ψ̄2 > 0, governments are strictly better off signing a Stability Pact with
0 ≤ ψ1 < ψ̄1 and 0 ≤ ψ2 < ψ̄2 and max[ψ1, ψ2] > 0. Expected social welfare is also
higher under any such Stability Pact chosen by the governments.
Proof: The proof is very similar to the proof of Proposition 4.3 and is, therefore,
omitted. •
Propositions 4.3 and 4.4 may explain why the discussion about a Stability Pact
has emerged in the public debate now that the date for EMU has become close. While
in the absence of an EMU, debt would be optimal from the governments’ point of
view (and a Stability Pact would only distort debt policy), in an EMU debt would
be suboptimally high even from the perspective of the governments of the countries
that will participate. In addition, even if some individual country would find some
mechanism to restrict its future debt accumulation, it is still concerned about the
excessive debt accumulation in other countries, because of the consequences for the
common inflation rate. A Stability Pact would correct at least part of this distortion.
We now proceed to find the optimal Stability Pact that governments can sign.
Under a union (with discretionary policymaking) governments attain their highest










Thus, one needs to find a combination of punishment parameters ψ1 < 1 and ψ2 > −1
which achieve equality here. One example would be to set ψ1 = 0 and solve for ψ2 > 0.
A second solution is to set ψ2 = 0 and to solve for 0 < ψ1 < (n−1)/n. A third solution
is to set ψ1 = (n− 1)/n and ψ2 = (1− n)/n. Obviously, there are many others.
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Such a Pact yields strictly higher utility for the governments than a monetary
union without a Stability Pact because the associated debt level in the latter case
is higher than bD,1, as was shown in Proposition 3.2. Furthermore an increase in n
induces increasing debt levels in the absence of a Stability Pact, and therefore requires
increases in the punishment parameters ψ1 or ψ2 to nonetheless achieve the optimal
debt level bD,1. This is not surprising, given that the incentive to internalise the
inflationary consequences of running excessive debts is weakened by an increase in the
size of the union.
5. Extension: shocks to the budget
The preceding analysis raises the question why countries seem to have felt compelled
to entertain a EMU anyhow. After all, as Proposition 4.1 showed, each country’s
government would have been better off without EMU and without a Stability Pact
than with EMU and some non-optimal Stability Pact. Even with an optimal Stability
Pact, the government can at most be as well off.
Of course, there are presumably many other issues that are of importance in assess-
ing the desire for an EMU aside from the issues studied in this paper. One possible
defense for our purposes here is thus to simply assume that an EMU is desirable
somehow for exogenous reasons, and that our analysis simply pertains to the added
desirability of a Stability Pact.
However, it is interesting that a rationale for both can be found even within our
analysis. We are now going to show that the governments will actually prefer EMU
with a well-designed Stability Pact to the case of autonomy (that is, neither monetary
unification nor a Stability Pact). This, of course, requires a slight change in the
assumptions made so far. The change is an appealing one: we assume that the first-
period budget constraints are subject to shocks εi, which change the countries’ first-
period endowment from 1 to 1 + εi. The shocks are assumed to be identically and
symmetrically distributed, with a mean of zero and finite variance. Moreover, they
are assumed to uncorrelated across countries.9 To keep things simple, no changes are
9Allowing for shocks that are correlated across countries does not yield much additional insight
and is, therefore, left out of consideration.
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made with respect to the second-period budget constraint. Formally, thus,






ψ1(bj − b̄), (5.1)
f2i + g2i = 1− bi[1 + π






ψ2(bj − b̄). (5.2)
Note that the federal budget is again balanced on a period by period basis.
We assume that the Stability Pact has to be signed before the realisations of the
shocks are known, but that the debt levels of the individual countries are chosen after
the shocks are known. Monetary policy is set as before in a discretionary manner in
the second period either by a national central bank or by the ECB in the case of an
EMU. We will show, that in expected utility terms, the government of each country is
better off with an EMU and a well-designed Stability Pact.
To this end, we first consider the solution to the autonomous case (denoted by
superscript “A”). Given some shock ε,10 let V A(ε) be the indirect utility of a first-
period government in the single-country case with a discretionary national central
bank, where the government has chosen its most preferred debt level bA(ε), i.e.
V A(ε) ≡ max
b
[






It is useful to note that:
Proposition 5.1. V A(·) is an increasing, strictly concave function in ε.
Proof: Maximising a strictly concave function results in a strictly concave func-
tion. Clearly, V A(·) is increasing. •
Consider now n countries with idiosynchratic mean-zero shocks εi, which are dis-







be the “average” shock. We now assume that there is a Stability Pact and that
countries form an EMU with the central bank behaving in a discretionary manner as
10If the argument of the utility function u(·) is restricted to a certain range, then it shall be
implicitly assumed that ε is restricted to a range such that a solution for b(ε) exists.
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before (we denote this case with superscript “E”). In particular, inflation is still set
according to equation (3.2). Furthermore, the first-order condition for government i
is again given by (4.3). For each government, the right-hand side of the first-order
condition (4.3) is the same. The monotonicity of u′ then implies that fE1 is the same
for each government, which is only possible if, for each government i (i = 1, .., n),
fE1i = 1 + b̃
E + ε̃ (5.4)









 (ε̃− εi) , (5.5)
Hence, the difference between country i’s debt and the average debt level is pro-
portional to (ε̃− εi), with a proportionality factor that depends on ψ1, but not on ψ2.
As long as 0 ≤ ψ1 < (n− 1) /n, an increase in ψ1 leads to a dispersion of debt levels
across the union! We formulate these insights as a proposition:
Proposition 5.2. In a monetary union with a Stability Pact and idiosynchratic
shocks to the first-period budget constraints of countries, fiscal first-period expen-
ditures in all countries are equal. Furthermore, the higher the first-period punishment
for excessive debt, the greater the debt dispersion.
The intuition is as follows: Suppose that εi < 0. Hence, the government of country
i has relatively few resources in the first period and, therefore, wants to issue debt.
This would require paying a fine to the federal budget and would result in even less
resources. The government tries to make up for this loss by borrowing even more. The
effect of a shock on the public debt is amplified by the Stability Pact. In fact, this
amplification mechanism has been the cause of some criticism against the Stability
Pact.
Our goal is instead to show that individual countries are better off with EMU and
a well-designed Stability Pact:
Proposition 5.3. Let ψ1 (k) = [(n− 1)/n] − 1/k and ψ2 (k) = [(1− n)/n] + 1/k =
−ψ1 (k). Then, the expected utility of each government in an EMU with a Stability
Pact characterised by ψ1 (k) and ψ2 (k) is given by E[V A(ε̃)], if we let k→∞. This ex-
pected utility is strictly higher than the expected utility E[V A(εi)] in the autonomous
case, unless the shocks are almost surely identical to zero.
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Proof: Consider some country i (i = 1, .., n). We assume that the shocks are not
trivial, i.e. that they are not almost surely identical to zero. First, we note that ε̃ is
less risky than εi, i.e. one can write
εi =
d ε̃+ νi, (5.6)
where νi is a nontrivial mean-zero random variable uncorrelated with ε̃ and where
=d means “distributed as”. One way to see this is to use the characterisation in
the Appendix of Chapter 5, p. 137, in Ingersoll (1987) of “second-order stochastic






where F (·) is the cumulative distribution function of εi and G(·) is the cumulative
distribution function of ε̃. However, this is immediately clear for t ≤ 0 and then
follows for t ≥ 0, because∫ 0
−t




since the shocks were assumed to be symmetrically distributed around zero.
With (5.6), we can now follow the proof of Theorem 1 in Chapter 5 in Ingersoll
(1987). By Jensen’s inequality and due to the strict concavity of V A(ε),
E[V A(ε̃+ νi) | ε̃] < V
A(E[ε̃+ νi | ε̃]) = V
A(ε̃).
Hence,
E[V A(εi)] = E[E[V
A(ε̃+ νi) | ε̃]] < E[V
A(ε̃)]. (5.7)
It now remains to show that E[V A(ε̃)] is indeed the expected utility of a country
participating in an EMU with a Stability Pact with the parameters ψ1 (k) and ψ2 (k),
where k →∞.
If the government of country i is re-elected, then, using (5.2), one can write
















where b̃E (k) is the average debt level and bEi (k) is country i’s debt level in a union
with Stability Pact parameters ψ1 (k) and ψ2 (k). Substituting the right-hand side of
11Note, that νi cannot be almost surely equal to zero, since that would otherwise imply that εi
and ε̃ have the same distribution.
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(5.5) for bEi (k) and using that ψ2 (k) = −ψ1 (k) yields f
E
2i = 1− b̃
E (k) + εi− ε̃. Hence,
using (5.4), the expected utility of country i’s government, for given Stability Pact
parameters ψ1 (k) and ψ2 (k) = −ψ1 (k) and conditional on the individual shock εi
and the average shock ε̃, is:
u
[












≡ V E(k) (5.8)
Equations (4.3) and (5.4) imply that b̃E (k) is implicitly defined by
u′
[




φn (1− ψ1 (k))
b̃E (k) .










However, this is exactly the first-order condition for an autonomous country, which
experiences the average shock ε̃. Hence, if k →∞, b̃E (k)→ bAi (ε̃), where b
A
i (ε̃)is the
debt level selected by government i in autonomy, if its budget is hit by a shock of size




























This finishes the proof. •
Note that if k → ∞ in Proposition 5.3, the dispersion of the debt levels across
the union becomes infinitely wide [see (5.5)]. However, because EMU in combination
with the limiting Pact in Proposition 5.3 is strictly better than autonomy [see equation
(5.7)], there exists a k <∞ such that EMU in combination with a Pact characterised
by ψ1 (k) and ψ2 (k) is strictly preferred to autonomy.
The intuition behind Proposition 5.3 is clear. Without an EMU, inflation will have
to move one-for-one with changes in a country’s debt. Since countries are quadratically
averse against inflation by assumption, they dislike variance in the debt. In an EMU,
inflation will move one-for-one with the changes in the average level of debt, and hence
will be less variable. This potentially beneficial effect of an EMU might be undone
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due to the heightened incentive of countries to run higher debt levels at the cost of
their neighbours. However, this incentive is exactly compensated for via the Stability
Pact: it turns out that the exact compensation requires a huge penalty for debt in the
first period and a huge subsidy in the second period.
6. Conclusion
This paper has investigated the proposed Stability Pact for the countries that are to
form an EMU. In particular, we have explained why countries that would otherwise
not want to sign a Stability Pact do want to sign such a Pact if they indeed go ahead
with monetary unification. The reason is that in a monetary union debt would be too
high (both from societies’ perspective as well as from the perspective of the first-period
governments), because governments fail to fully internalise the benefits of reducing the
debt in terms of lower future inflation.
We have also shown that with a stochastic first-period budget, countries strictly
prefer to enter an EMU with a well-designed Stability Pact than to remain au-
tonomous. The reason is that in an EMU inflation is attuned to the average debt
level and is therefore more stable than inflation in the autonomous case. The role of
the Stability Pact is to correct the average debt bias which arises in a union in which
the governments do not fully internalise the inflationary consequences of their debt
policies.
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